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The First Amendment and the
International "Free Flow" of
Information
FRED H. CATE*
In 1979, Mustapha Masmoudi, permanent delegate of Tunisia to
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
("UNESCO"), addressed the effect of the proliferation of Western,
media and communication industries on Third World2 receivers. In a
paper entitled, "The New World Information Order,"' Masmoudi
argued that UNESCO's concern that the international flow of infor-
mation be free was insufficient; instead, Masmoudi called for an inter-
national information flow that is not only free, but also balanced.
Masmoudi was preceded and followed by other representatives of
Third World countries, who, while often disagreeing with the specifics
of his proposed solution, concurred with Masmoudi's conclusion that
the dominance of Western media had a detrimental effect in the Third
World. These officials have suggested a variety of Third World inter-
ests that are affected by the imbalance in international communica-
* Fellow, The Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies. The
author acknowledges the generous support of The Annenberg Washington Program and the
law firm of Debevoise & Plimpton. The author alone is responsible for the assessments herein.
1. The term "Western" here and throughout the Article refers to the United States, Canada,
and countries in Western Europe. The term does not refer to all countries in the western
hemisphere.
2. The term "Third World" here and throughout the Article refers to countries other than
the United States, Canada, the U.S.S.R., and those countries comprising Western Europe and
the so-called Soviet bloc. The term "developing countries" as used below is synonymous with
"Third World" countries.
3. Masmoudi, The New World Information Order, in Crisis in International News 77 (J.
Richstad & M. Anderson eds. 1981) [hereinafter Crisis]. The New World Information Order
is referred to variously by other commentators as the New World Information and
Communication Order, the New World Communication Order, and the New International
Information Order.
"FREE FLOW" OF INFORMATION
tion, including political sovereignty, cultural autonomy, and
commercial development.
The United States, source of most of the Western press communi-
cations, first responded to the concern over the imbalance in commu-
nications flow with little interest. But when UNESCO began
adopting resolutions that would impose limits on the press, the U.S.
government responded quickly and severely, ultimately withdrawing
from UNESCO. The U.S. press has demonstrated little more sympa-
thy for the Third World's concerns. The communications imbalance
issue has been largely ignored, and when proposed solutions were
reported the U.S. press has shown determined opposition.
Today the United States is challenged not by proposals for
redressing perceived inequities from the Third World, but rather by
initiatives from its oldest and most powerful allies. Broadcasting
restrictions agreed to by the European Commission in October 1989
would limit both the amount and content of U.S.-origin program-
ming, in order to protect against further erosion of traditional Euro-
pean culture.
This article examines the debate over restricting the "free flow" of
information as a means to diminishing the "cultural domination"
exercised by the Western media in the Third World and by U.S.
media in Western Europe. The article seeks to illustrate the diversity
of views that exist in the debate over restricting the international flow
of information for cultural and political reasons, and to analyze U.S.
responses to those proposed restrictions in light of the First Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution.
Part I of the article focuses on some of the concerns about informa-
tion flow expressed by the Third World countries, and some of the
proposed solutions. Part II focuses on the U.S. response to Third
World proposals. Part III addresses the effect of the First Amend-
ment on U.S. domestic media regulation, particularly broadcasting.
Part IV considers the most recent challenge to U.S. concepts of free
speech, the European Broadcasting Directive. The article concludes
that the interests underlying the First Amendment, rather than block-
ing all efforts to create greater balance in the flow of information,
weigh in favor of some media regulation.
I. THE DEBATE OVER "FREE FLoW": THIRD WORLD
PERSPECTIVES
A. Origins of the 'Tree Flow" Debate
In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted unanimously the
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights.4 In Article 19 of the Decla-
ration, the General Assembly explicitly recognized free expression as
a fundamental human right: "Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. ' 5
Article 19 provided not only for freedom of expression in the sense
traditionally understood to be suggested by the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution-"Congress shall make no law.., abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press" 6-- but goes further to guaran-
tee the right to receive information. The meaning of this extension,
which implies a right to communicate instead of merely to speak, is
significant. It suggests that the United Nations was not interested
solely in the rights of speakers and writers, but also in the rights of
listeners and hearers.
This view of an international free flow of communication was fos-
tered by a quixotic campaign by the U.S. press and government dur-
ing the 1940s and early 1950s to export First Amendment concepts to
the rest of the world. This campaign, described by Margaret
Blanchard as a "crusade,"' 7 focused on the political and social virtues
of an unrestricted press and, to a lesser degree, on the freedom of
people living in the Third World and particularly in the Soviet Union
to listen to Voice of America programming and have access to West-
ern films, books, and magazines.8
According to Professor Blanchard, the quest met with little success
and came to an end in the early 1950s, largely because the U.S. press
realized that the First Amendment could not be exported without
considerable assistance from the federal government. 9 That assistance
brought with it government involvement in press affairs that many in
the press believed violated a principle tenet of the First Amendment
they were trying to export. In addition, as is discussed below,'0 some
countries were already showing determined opposition to U.S. con-
cepts of a free press.
But the model of unrestricted communications that the United
4. G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
5. Id. art. 19.
6. U.S. Const. amend. I.
7. M. Blanchard, Exporting the First Amendment: The Press-Government Crusade of
1945-1952 1 (1986).
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 352.
10. See infra notes 14-71 and accompanying text.
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States claimed to offer was not without influence. In the period before
the 1960s, the general international commitment to unrestricted com-
munications went virtually unchallenged. International discourse
often focused on the free flow of information as an essential step in
fostering cooperation and better relations between nations and peo-
ples, and as particularly important to improving political and eco-
nomic relations between the West and the Third World. When
UNESCO was founded as the instrument through which many of the
social and economic goals of the international community were to be
achieved, its founders stressed in its constitution the importance of
"unrestricted pursuit of objective truth and the free exchange of ideas
and knowledge.""1
In 1957, however, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution
1313 which stated: "Reiterating its belief in the free flow of undis-
torted news and information within countries and across national
frontiers as the essential basis for an accurate and undistorted under-
standing of events and situations .... ,12 The resolution concluded by
calling on Member States to aid in "facilitating the free flow of accu-
rate information through all media." 3
A number of countries, particularly in the Third World, were dis-
pleased by the existing state of international communications. They
charged that the "unrestricted" approach to international communi-
cations was a Western concept that had led to Western dominated
news and entertainment programming. This resulted in "cultural
domination" in the Third World and ignorance about Third World
countries in the West.1 4 Moreover, the existence of an established
Western media was for economic and technological reasons stymieing
the development of indigenous news and entertainment media.15
Finally, with the development and deployment of the geostationary
communications satellite, many Third World countries believed that
the limited number of geostationary orbit slots were being filled by
Western satellites, thereby furthering the dominance of Western
media and making it increasingly difficult for Third World countries
to deploy such satellites when they had the resources and capability to
11. UNESCO Const. preamble.
12. G.A. Res. 1313, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 26, U.N. Doc. No. A/4090 (1958).
13. Id.
14. See generally Communication and Domination: Essays to Honor Herbert I. Schiller (J.
Becker, G. Hedebro & L. Paldin eds. 1986).
15. See generally E. Contreras, J. Larson, J. Mayo & P. Spain, Cross-Cultural Broadcasting
(1976).
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do so. 16
UNESCO became the forum for debate on these and other issues
relating to the international communications flow and during the
1960s UNESCO sought to identify and propose solutions for regional
communications problems. Proposals were considered for the specific
purpose of creating Third World news agencies, in order to "increase
the developing world's means of expression and to gather and
exchange news, films, and various broadcasts for the mutual benefit of
these countries." 17 By 1969 the debate had taken on some of the fla-
vor which continues to characterize it today. At a conference held in
Canada, a group of communications experts adopted a recommenda-
tion calling for a "balanced circulation of news" and stressing in par-
ticular that more information should flow from the Third World to
the West. 1 8
At the 1970 General Conference of UNESCO, several developing
countries raised "the issue of the unequal distribution of the media,
asking that better adapted and balanced international news exchange
systems be organized and stressing the right to cultural identity."1 9
At the 1972 General Conference, a majority of Member States
"emphasized more forcefully still the potential dangers of news flow
imbalance."20 In 1974, the Soviet Union introduced a "draft declara-
tion on fundamental principles governing the use of the mass media in
strengthening peace and international understanding and in combat-
ting war propaganda, racism and apartheid."' 2 1 The 1974 General
Conference recommended that two Intergovernment Conferences on
communications policies be held. 22 Finally, at the 1976 General Con-
ference, UNESCO Director General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow
appointed a commission chaired by former Irish Foreign Minister and
Nobel Peace Prize recipient Sean MacBride, to study "the totality of
communication problems in modern societies. '23
While the MacBride Commission began its awesome task, the
16. See J. Powell, International Broadcasting by Satellite: Issues of Regulation, Barriers to
Communication 207-10 (1985).
17. Int'l Comm'n for the Study of Comm. Probs., Many Voices, One World 40 (1980)
[hereinafter MacBride Comm'n Report].
18. R. Stevenson & D. Shaw, Foreign News and the New World Information Order 5
(1984).
19. MacBride Comm'n Report, supra note 17, at 40.
20. Id.
21. Power & Abel, Third World vs. The Media, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1980, § 6, at 119, col.
1. The text of the draft declaration was never published officially.
22. MacBride Comm'n Report, supra note 17, at 40.
23. Id. at xvii, 42.
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UNESCO countries continued to confer. The two Intergovernment
Conferences-one in San Jose de Costa Rica in 1976 and another in
Kuala Lampur in 1979-produced recommendations urging that new
communications policies be adopted "conceived in the context of
national realities, free expression of thought and respect for individual
and societal rights." 24 The Kuala Lampur Conference in particular
stressed that "communication, considered both as a means of
affirming a nation's collective identity and an instrument of social
integration, has a decisive role to play in the democratization of social
relations ... .,"25 At the 1978 UNESCO General Conference, a simi-
lar resolution was adopted that endorsed freedom of the press but also
stressed the need "for the establishment of a new equilibrium and
greater reciprocity in the flow of information... for a free flow and
wider and more balanced dissemination of information. 26
B. The New World Information Order
Probably the most far-reaching proposals for addressing the per-
ceived imbalance in international communications came from Mus-
tapha Masmoudi, the permanent delegate of Tunisia to UNESCO and
a member of the MacBride Commission. In a paper entitled "The
New World Information Order,"2 7 Masmoudi argued that: "Infor-
mation plays a paramount role in international relations, both as a
means of communication between peoples and as an instrument of
understanding and knowledge between nations.... However, what
must be noted right away is that the present international information
system shows a profound imbalance between developed and develop-
ing countries." '28
Masmoudi identified seven features of that imbalance. First, Mas-
moudi cited a "flagrant quantitative imbalance between North and
South," evidenced by the fact that eighty percent of the world's news
flow originates from the major Western news agencies, of which only
twenty to thirty percent treats the Third World, even though the
Third World accounts for seventy-five percent of the world's popula-
tion.29 Second, there exists "[a]n inequality in information
24. Id. at 40 (quoting from the San Jos6 Conference recommendation).
25. Id. at 41.
26. Power & Abel, supra note 19, at 121, col. 2 (quoting UNESCO Declaration on the Role
of the Mass Media, arts. VI, IX).
27. Masmoudi, supra note 3, at 77.
28. Id. at 78.
29. Id. at 79.
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resources." 30 Third, the West shows "[a] de facto hegemony and a
will to dominate" not only international communications, but also
economics, politics, and technology. 31 Fourth, Masmoudi cited the
"lack of information on developing countries" that is reported in the
Western and Western-dominated international media.32 Fifth, Mas-
moudi argued that the "present-day information system enshrines a
form of political, economic and cultural colonialism. '33
This consists in highlighting events whose significance ... is
limited or even nonexistent; in collecting isolated facts and
presenting them as a "whole"; in setting out facts in such a
way that ... is necessarily favorable to the interests of the
transnational system; in amplifying small-scale events so as
to arouse unjustified fears; in keeping silent on situations
unfavorable to the interests of the countries of origin of
these media.34
Sixth, Masmoudi stressed that the West influences control over
media, even in the Third World, through direct investment, through a
"near-monopoly on advertising throughout the world," and through
the direct use of propaganda in the West.35 Finally, Masmoudi
charged that Western media reports "[m]essages ill-suited to the areas
in which they are disseminated. 36
Masmoudi then addressed the meaning of "free flow" in the mod-
em world. He concluded, first, that traditional Western guarantees of
free expression had the effect of protecting the rights of individuals
over the rights of groups or communities.37 Thus, a society wishing to
maintain some form of cultural identity could be prohibited from
doing so, under traditional Western protections, because of the right
of a speaker outside of that group. "[The present international legal
framework] favors a small number of countries at the expense of the
majority, thanks to a conception of liberty peculiar to those who own
or control the communication media-and who are frequently the
very same people who own or control the means of production. 38
Masmoudi also concluded that because of the commercial nature of
30. Id. at 79-81.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 80.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 80-81.
36. Id. at 81.
37. Id. at 82.
38. Id.
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the mass media, the right of access to information and to the media
belongs only to those with the resources to obtain it.39 Masmoudi
pointed to the absence of any set of international regulations or code
of ethics to govern journalism and to assure that journalists report
information truthfully and equitably.'
Masmoudi's arguments tie in closely with other Third World con-
cerns that the West's dominance of technological and manufacturing
resources creates a drastic inequality between Western and Third
World countries.41 This inequality, according to Third World critics,
is protected and furthered by a system of Western-oriented laws that
stress free market activity and the importance of governmental nonin-
terference. The Western analogy, for Masmoudi and others, might be
to U.S. antitrust laws:42 while reflecting a preference for free market
activity, these laws demonstrate the government's willingness to regu-
late in order to assure that the market mechanism operates reasonably
fairly. Free market activity without such regulation of monopolies
might still be "free"-in the sense of unregulated-but it would not
be equitable or as productive or successful as the lawmakers desire.
Similarly, Masmoudi might argue, a "free flow" of information, when
carried on between states having radically different economic and
political positions, requires regulation to assure that the market does
not produce a result that is unfairly skewed.
In "The New World Information Order" Masmoudi pointed out
that ninety percent of the world's radio frequency spectrum is con-
trolled by a tiny fraction of the world's population in developed coun-
tries.43 The technological lead and greater economic resources of the
West, are protected by tariff systems, also established by the West,
which provide favorable rates to Western countries for communica-
tions and communications technology-related trade.44 This is in part,
Masmoudi argues, because the infrastructure of international commu-
nications is largely inherited from trade and communication patterns
of the colonial past. The infrastructure and tariffs favor a greater vol-
ume of traffic among developed countries and from developed to
39. Id.
40. Id. at 82-83.
41. See, e.g., Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (1974); Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3202 (1974).
42. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1988).
43. Masmoudi, supra note 3, at 85; see generally T. McPhail, Electronic Colonialism 216
(1981).
44. Masmoudi, supra note 3, at 84.
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developing countries, rather than among developing countries or from
developing to developed countries.4 5
Masmoudi, therefore, called for a "free and balanced" flow of infor-
mation, brought about through a New World Information Order.
The new world information order founded on democratic
principles seeks to establish relations of equality in the com-
munications field between developed and developing nations
and aims at greater justice and greater balance. Far from
calling in question the freedom of information, it proposes
to ensure that the principle is applied fairly and equitably
for all nations and not only in the case of the more devel-
oped among them.4 6
Under the new order, Third World countries would create national
communications policies, national news agencies, and networks to
facilitate improved production and exchange of programming.47
Western countries would be called on to show greater respect for
Third World values and cultures, and to report a wider variety of
news from a wider variety of sources.4a International organizations,
such as UNESCO, would act to subsidize the work of Third World
media and to sponsor research, training, and technological develop-
ment of media in the Third World.49 Masmoudi also called on inter-
national agencies to regulate spectrum and geostationary orbit
distribution more fairly, paying greater attention to developing Third
World capabilities.5 ° Masmoudi urged a revision of the international
telecommunications tariff structure, to provide more favorable terms
for tariffs and air freight surcharges which apply to transporting pub-
lications to and from developing countries.5 1 Finally, Masmoudi
called on professional journalists to establish an international code of
ethics. 52
Masmoudi's most controversial specific recommendation called for
regulations based on the content of the information being communi-
cated. Masmoudi stressed that sovereign states have a right to objec-
tive, balanced, and accurate news, and therefore should have the right
to correct or demand retraction of news that does not meet those cri-
45. T. McPhail, supra note 43, at 86.
46. Id. at 86.
47. Id. at 87.
48. Id. at 88.
49. Id. at 89-90.
50. See id. at 89-90, 93-95.
51. Id. at 94-95.
52. Id. at 95.
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teria.53 Masmoudi called for:
* Regulation to prevent abuses of the right of access to
information;
" Definition of appropriate criteria to govern objective news
selection;
* Regulation of the collection, processing, and transmission
of news and data across national frontiers ....
Masmoudi was for many years regarded as the chief spokesperson
for the Third World. As attention to international telecommunica-
tions waned in the 1980s, however, so has Masmoudi's standing. In
fact, his own government has disavowed his position as spokesperson
for Tunisia. Moreover, Masmoudi always represented the extreme
position of the Third World. Contained in his proposals are most of
those of other Third World leaders, but few countries in the Third
World have endorsed Masmoudi's whole panoply of solutions.
C. The Role of Cultural Autonomy
One of the most important variations on the themes espoused by
Masmoudi focuses on the Third World's concern with preserving cul-
tural identity and independence. A prominent spokesperson for this
issue is Mochtar Lubis, President of the Press Foundation of Asia and
a member of the MacBride Commission. In a paper presented to the
Commission entitled "Interaction Between Culture and Communica-
tion,"55 Lubis adopted a more moderate tone than Masmoudi and dis-
avowed much of the "domination" and anti-Western rhetoric that
Masmoudi employed. Nonetheless, Lubis expressed concern over the
impact of imported communications on the culture and cultural iden-
tity of Third World countries. According to Lubis, "modern commu-
nications [are] a powerful instrument to influence the attitudes,
habits, taste, perceptions of many people around the world.... Thus
communications penetrate into the deepest layers of the societal fabric
and of culture."5 6
Lubis argued that "[i]n most cases the new attitudes and appetites
work to the detriment of traditional culture, and traditional products,
53. Id. at 93.
54. Id. at 92.
55. Lubis, Interaction Between Culture and Communication, 76 Int'l Comm'n for the Study
of Comm. Probs. I (n.d.). The author gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of Elie Abel,
Professor of Communications at Stanford University and the U.S. representative on the
MacBride Commission, who provided the background papers prepared by members of the
Commission.
56. Id. at 2.
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and change social as well as cultural values, including ethics and
esthetics. '5 7 Lubis offered three examples: the impact of Western
advertisements on Third World purchasing patterns; the impact of
Western media on entertainment activities, noting particularly the
decline of personal interaction and community cooperation; and the
blame that the Western media placed on Third World countries for
the oil shortages in the 1970s, without considering the role of oil in
Third World economies.58
Lubis stressed that governments should not restrict the media: cul-
tural development requires a free exchange of ideas, perceptions and
insights. But neither should corporations, economics, politics, ideol-
ogy, or regulatory structures act to restrict free, two-way communica-
tions. A truly free exchange is impossible where so many factors act
to create a dramatic imbalance between Western and Third World
media and communications capabilities.
The deprivation of information to members or to groups in a
society, the non-existence of a free flow of information, a
one-way communication situation, monopolies of informa-
tion or communications (whether by governments or private
companies) causes a breakdown in the nerve system of the
society which will produce cultural setbacks in the widest
sense of the word. The same situation at the international
level also causes similar breakdowns and setbacks among
members of the international community. 59
Lubis's concern has been shared by many Third World countries.
That concern is heightened by the fact that many communications
problems are beyond the control of developing countries. Some of the
issues are fairly straightforward. For instance, the fact that television
and radio programming can often be bought from the West more
affordably than it can be produced within developing countries has
caused many Third World broadcasters to import the cheaper prod-
uct.6' When and if a country develops more advanced and economi-
cal programming abilities, its programs often tend to resemble
Western shows. These problems have solutions-albeit disagreeable
ones from a U.S. point of view-since any country is theoretically free
to regulate its own internal broadcast entertainment industry.
More difficult problems are those caused by factors outside the
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 4.
60. See E. Contreras, supra note 15, at 37.
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individual nation's control, but still within regional or international
control. For instance, many countries complain that the supply of
international news is dominated by four wire services, all of which
originate in the West.61 In the 1970s, a number of countries
responded by creating the News Agencies Pool of Nonaligned Coun-
tries.6 2 This news service acts as an alternative to the Western "big
four," and as a clearinghouse for Third World news. Theoretically,
such an agency could also act as a clearinghouse for Third World
entertainment programming as well, or perhaps even as a central pro-
duction facility. Thus far, this has not been the case and, given the
diversity within the Third World, seems unlikely in the near future.
The most difficult set of issues relating to the cultural autonomy
concerns of the Third World are those problems which seem wholly
beyond the control of Third World countries. These include the
problems of the Western mass media ignoring Third World news and
issues or portraying Third World countries in a unfavorable light.
Also in this category is the problem of Direct Broadcast Satellites
("DBS"), whereby countries like the United States broadcast not only
propaganda, but all forms of news and entertainment programming,
into a country without that country's permission. Because of the eco-
nomics involved, the problem is seldom one of a Western country
deliberately broadcasting entertainment programming to an unwilling
receiver country. Rather, the problem most often is spillover: the
signal is broadcast from a satellite to a willing recipient, but the signal
spills over into neighboring countries. 3
DBS spillover should arguably be less of a problem as new technol-
ogy provides increasingly narrow signals. As DBS technology has
improved, however, many broadcasters have begun covering entire
nations, rather than a single city or installation, with a single broad-
cast signal, resulting in considerable spillover." Moreover, the
problems associated with unwanted signals are not limited to DBS
spillover and the Third World. Canada has lodged frequent protests
about the disastrous effect of signal spillover from U.S. broadcasting
facilities near the U.S.-Canadian border on Canadian culture and on
61. Those four global news agencies are: Associated Press (New York), United Press
International (New York), Reuters (London), Agence France-Presse (Paris). Commentators
differ over whether the Soviet Union national news agency TASS should also be considered a
global news agency. See generally D. Weaver and G. Wilhoit, Foreign News in the Western
Agencies, in Foreign News and the New World Information Order 153 (Stevenson ed. 1984);
T. McPhail, supra note 43, 171-79 (1981).
62. Mankekar, The Nonaligned News Pool, in Crisis, supra note 3, at 369.
63. See J. Powell, supra note 16, at 212-15.
64. Id.
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the Canadian broadcasting industry.6 5 Culturally, economically, and
politically, spillover poses a serious threat, and one which has thus far
defied successful regulation by any agency other than the broadcast-
ing country.
D. The MacBride Commission Report
After four years of extensive study, the MacBride Commission in
1980 produced its long awaited report. The report, published under
the title Many Voices, One World,66 thoroughly discussed many
national and international communication issues. The report con-
cluded with 82 specific recommendations, grouped together under five
headings: Strengthening Independence and Self-Reliance, Social Con-
sequences and New Tasks, Professional Integrity and Standards,
Democratization of Communication, and Fostering International
Cooperation. Many of these recommendations were primarily calls
for further study.
On the topic of the "balance" of the international flow of informa-
tion, the Commission rejected many of the more controversial Third
World proposals. The Commission recommended that developing
countries strengthen their communication and news reporting indus-
tries.67 The Commission called for a major research and development
effort to increase the supply of paper for newsprint, reduction of tele-
communication tariffs for poorer countries, and re-examination of the
division of the electromagnetic spectrum and the geostationary orbit
to assure that these resources are divided equally among countries. 68
With specific regard to preserving the cultural identity of Third
World nations, the Commission recommended that countries identify
and promote cultural priorities and that they introduce "guidelines
with respect to advertising content and the values and attitudes that it
fosters."'69 The Commission produced a variety of related recommen-
dations, ranging from encouraging the development of non-commer-
cial broadcasting to suggesting that the Western press "allot more
space and time to reporting events in and background materials about
foreign countries in general and news from the developing world in
particular."70 The professional press was called upon to adhere to a
high standard of "truthfulness, accuracy and respect for human
65. See generally id. at 178, 213.
66. MacBride Comm'n Report, supra note 17.
67. Id. at 255-56.
68. Id. at 257-58.
69. Id. at 259-60.
70. Id. at 260-63.
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rights;" when the press fails to meet that standard, the Commission
concluded, "the public.., is entitled to hold them accountable for
their actions."''7
Perhaps the most controversial recommendations of the MacBride
Commission were those that called on the media to promote certain
social, cultural, economic and political goals:
All those working in the mass media should contribute to
the fulfillment of human rights, both individual and collec-
tive .... The contribution of the media in this regard is not
only to foster these principles, but also to expose all infringe-
ments, wherever they occur, and to support those whose
rights have been neglected or violated....
The media should contribute to promoting the just cause
of peoples struggling for freedom and independence and
their right to live in peace and equality without foreign
interferences.7 2
The Commission also urged that: "Effective legal measures should be
designed to: (a) limit the process of concentration and monopoliza-
tion; (b) circumscribe the action of transnationals by requiring them
to comply with specific criteria and conditions defined by national leg-
islation and development policies ....
Despite the fact that these represented the more moderate of Third
World proposals, the MacBride Commission recommendations did
little to ameliorate the conflict between Third World countries and
the West over international communications flow.
II. THE DEBATE OVER "FREE FLOW": THE U.S. RESPONSE
A. From the Press
The United States-both press and government-almost wholly
ignored Third World calls for attention to the "free flow" issue until
the late 1970s. Faced with Masmoudi's proposal for a New World
Information Order and the existence of a commission with an
unknown stance on the issue, the press began to pay attention. One
commentator referred to the New World Information Order as a
"very touchy issue for most of the western press-particularly in the
United States, where just mentioning it seems enough to transform
normally calm, fair-minded news executives into desk-pounding
71. Id. at 262.
72. Id. at 265.
73. Id. at 266.
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ideologues."74
Between 1976 and 1983, The New York Times ran 141 articles and
editorials dealing with the press debate in UNESCO and the U.S. gov-
ernment's response. The tone of these pieces was almost uniformly
hostile, often characterizing the issue as being an attempt by
"undemocratic governments" to censor the press. In fact, more than
half of the 141 pieces were editorials and columns criticizing the
"quiet moves" being made by UNESCO to "curb freedom of the
press."
Several examples may help illustrate the vehemence of the press's
opposition to the discussion about international information flow. In
one editorial, "UNESCO as Censor," The New York Times called
UNESCO "the thought-controllers," and concluded: "Let there be
no doubt in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization-which aims to become the arbiter of "responsible"
communication-that American journalism values its freedom from
official scrutiny and control more than it values UNESCO, or even
the United Nations." 75
Richard Leonard, chairman of the International Press Institute and
editor of the Milwaukee Journal, gave the following characterization
of the effects of the New World Information Order: "Among other
things it would mean accepting the idea of state control over all news
and information coming into or going out of any country, thereby
imposing censorship and vastly reducing the amount of information
about the world that a free society like ours needs....
Leonard is inaccurate in suggesting that even Masmoudi's proposal
would require "state control over all news and information." More
significant, however, is Leonard's insistence on considering the most
radical proposal-not the authoritative MacBride Commission
Report-and a proposal that had already been disavowed by many
Third World countries. Moreover, Leonard reflects a common U.S.
view of the problem by focusing only on U.S. interests.
Not every Western response to the "free flow" debate has been hos-
tile. Gerald Long, former managing director of Reuters, wrote:
The feeling among many nonindustrial countries.., is that
they lack the information structure present in the industrial
74. D. Wood, Perspectives on a New World Information Order 33 (1985) (unpublished
A.B. thesis, Stanford University). The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and
critical insight of Donna C. Wood.
75. UNESCO as Censor, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1980, at A32, col. 1.
76. R. Leonard, U.S. Concerns with the UNESCO Communications Program 3 (1984).
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world, in which they are right, and that they should have
that structure, in which aspiration they are justified; that
their countries are little and poorly reported in the press of
the industrial countries, which is true, and should be better
reported, which is desirable."
Long, however, concluded by criticizing the debate for being too
focused on the political consequences of information flow. Long's
argument is essentially that the press should be in the business of the
search for truth in events, not the study of problems. Long is joined
in this perception by other Western journalists who, while sensitive to
the Third World's communications problems, believe that the current
debate reflects a political concern by Third World authoritarian gov-
ernments to gain control over their countries' media.
A final category of Western response to the free flow debate has
been one of sympathy, overshadowed by economic determinism.
According to media experts, economic factors more than political
motives or ideology shape the nature of news gathering agencies and
the news that they gather and distribute. For instance, Mort Rosen-
blum, former editor of the International Herald Tribune, has sug-
gested that there are only four major international news agencies
because it is economically impossible to support more." Similarly,
the Western press tends to focus on Western events and only reports
disasters from the Third World, reflecting the economic impossibility
of keeping news bureaus throughout the Third World and the eco-
nomic reality of what Western consumers want. Keith Fuller of
Associated Press has noted that "AP's total gross revenue from the
lesser-developed countries is less than 1 percent of our income. Our
coverage costs in those areas exceed our revenue many times over." °
The profit issue undoubtedly played a significant role in the almost
uniform hostility evidenced by the Western press for the New World
Information Order. As is discussed below with regard to the U.S.
government's response,8 ' the Western press was always mindful that
restrictions on the press in any form were likely to cause economic
loss. John M. Eger, telecommunications adviser to Presidents Rich-
ard Nixon and Gerald Ford, former head of the White House Office
of Telecommunications Policy, and, until 1986, senior vice president
77. Power & Abel, supra note 26, at 117 (quoting Gerald Long).
78. See Righter, World Communication Issues, in Crisis, supra note 3, at 56.
79. Rosenblum, Reporting from the Third World, in Crisis, supra note 3, at 221.
80. Fuller, AP: Covering the World, in Crisis, supra note 3, at 271, 273.
81. See infra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
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of CBS Worldwide Enterprises, equated the concern that "the free
flow of information seems to be under fire" with a concern that "the
channels of trade in communications goods and services are
clogged."82 Eger cites to the fact that even fifteen years ago "more
than half our workers were employed in something called an informa-
tion sector, that more than half our gross national product depended
on the production, use, storage and transfer of information, and that
we needed a national information policy."'8 3
The U.S. concern over the New World Information Order is
grounded in the fact that "international barriers pose serious
problems for those companies directly involved in the communica-
tions business and for others who depend on the free flow of commu-
nications to do their business." 84
The New World Information Order, then, was viewed by the press
not only as a challenge to First Amendment principles, but also as an
impediment to higher profits resulting from global information flows.
B. From the Government
The U.S. government, like the press, following its unsuccessful
effort to export U.S. concepts of the free flow of communications
immediately following World War II, largely ignored the "free flow"
debate until the mid-1970s. While the government had taken an
active role in geostationary orbit and spectrum allocation talks, it had
shown little interest in the Third World's concerns over the Western
media's domination of international communications. When the
Soviet Union in the 1974 UNESCO General Conference introduced a
"draft declaration on fundamental principles governing the use of the
mass media in strengthening peace and international understanding
and in combating war propaganda, racism and apartheid," the U.S.
delegation walked out of the Conference. 5 In 1976, U.S. Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger threatened that the United States would with-
draw from UNESCO if the Mass Media Declaration was adopted.8 6
With the formation of the MacBride Commission, U.S. policy
turned to one of concerted opposition. The U.S. representative on the
MacBride Commission, Elie Abel, former dean of the Columbia
82. Eger, The Importance of Working for a Free Flow of Global Information,
Broadcasting, Mar. 14, 1988, at 24.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Power & Abel, supra note 26, at 119, col. 2.
86. Frederick, UNESCO's Mass Media Declaration, Ten Years of Accomplishment?
Intermedia, July-Sept. 1987, at 76.
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School of Journalism, had been for many years an active journalist
and was known to have little sympathy for the Third World's charges
of cultural domination. James Buckley, Under Secretary of State for
Security, Assistance, Science and Technology, when the MacBride
Commission produced its report, described the U.S. response to the
"free flow" debate as "fighting the good fight."87 Buckley went on to
address the issues more directly than did most Reagan Administra-
tion spokespersons:
Developing countries argue for what they call a better "bal-
ance" in international distributed news about their countries
and their activities. We can and should make an effort to
help these nations meet their own legitimate communica-
tions needs but never at the expense of free and unfettered
reporting by nongovernmental agencies.88
But the real concern for the United States, according to Buckley, is
the importance of communications industries to the United States and
the U.S.'s balance of payments. "For the United States, communica-
tions and information technologies represent a leading edge of U.S.
strength. Policy and practice in international communications and
information activities must actively enhance the overall well-being of
the United States, the lives of its people, and its system of
government."8 9
The problem, Buckley wrote, is that the U.S. lead in communica-
tions is slipping. "Other industrialized nations are advancing in com-
munications and information technologies; some are rapidly assuming
a major role and gaining large shares of world markets. Newly indus-
trialized countries wish to gain a foothold in an area which represents
the wave of the future." 90
Buckley then turned to the opposition that the United States and
U.S. communication values faced from other Western countries, from
Eastern countries, and from the Third World-that is, from the U.S.'s
economic competitors. For the United States to maintain its domina-
tion of the communications industry, it should undertake actions
designed to, among other things, "enlarge acceptance of the principle
of free international flow of information and ideas, including applica-
bility of this principle to newly emerging communications and infor-
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mation technologies. 9
In 1982, with the MacBride Commission Report in hand, the U.S.
Congress passed the Beard Amendment to the State Department's
authorization bill.92 The amendment called for withholding U.S. con-
tributions to UNESCO if the organization undertook measures to
limit press freedom anywhere in the world.
In 1984, Edmund Hennelly, chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the
1983 UNESCO General Conference, testified on the free flow debate
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He noted that the
UNESCO Secretariat, responding to prodding from the radical Third
World states, often allied with the Soviet Bloc, had produced working
papers concerning international rules and procedures which, no mat-
ter what their intention, would in fact have hobbled press freedom
and the free flow of information throughout the world.93
Hennelly went on to present a parade of horribles-the most odious
by traditional Western standards of the regulations suggested by some
Third World delegates-despite the fact that none of these were
endorsed by the MacBride Commission and none had, or have since,
been endorsed by UNESCO.94
Hennelly testified that his instructions from the President included
the elimination of programs which would limit press freedom or the
free flow of information throughout the world from UNESCO's Com-
munications Sector. Additionally, if possible, to introduce into
UNESCO programs Western free press concepts and values. 95
Hennelly then testified that his delegation was successful in this
regard:
UNESCO's Communications sector was improved. Pro-
grams which could have hampered the workings of a free
press were deleted or substantially modified, and several
Western concepts were added, e.g. the concept that censor-
ship, including state censorship, is an important impediment
to the free flow of information, and the idea that the press
has a critical role to play in exposing abuses of power.96
91. Id.
92. Pub. L. No. 97-241, § 109(a).
93. U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights
and International Organizations and on International Operations of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-17 (1984) (statement of Edmund P. Hennelly,
chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the 22nd General Conference of UNESCO).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 24.
96. Id.
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-That progress was made in this area was recognized by
such staunch defenders of press freedom as the World Press
Freedom Committee whose representative at the conference
sent telegrams to interested groups at the end of the confer-
ence indicating that, and I paraphrase-if anyone is looking
for a reason to leave UNESCO, they will not find it in the
communications program adopted at the conference. In the
words of the Wall Street Journal, "efforts to impose a New
World Communications Order were derailed."
-I understand that the State Department's current report
to Congress, in compliance with the Beard Amendment,
indicates that UNESCO is not doing anything counter to
the intent of that amendment to impede the ability of a free
press. 9
7
Hennelly's testimony aside, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz
nonetheless notified U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellular
and UNESCO Director General Amadou Mahtar M'Bow that the
United States was withdrawing from UNESCO, citing concerns about
the budget and that UNESCO was straying from its original agenda. 98
In his response to Secretary Shultz, Director General M'Bow stressed
that "in the thirty-seven years since its foundation, there may have
been some changes in the subjects of immediate concern to Unesco
and in the weight of emphasis placed by the General Conference on
particular aspects of the programmes which it has adopted."9 9 The
Director General noted that in those 37 years, many former colonies
had come to political independence; the membership of UNESCO had
increased from 28 to 161 sovereign states. UNESCO owed those
nations, as much as the United States, its assistance in helping attain
its objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of
mankind."°o
Director General M'Bow then turned to what he seemed to feel
underlay the U.S. action:
97. Id.
98. Letter from U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to UNESCO Director General
Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow (Dec. 28, 1983) (copy on file at the offices of the Virginia Journal of
International Law); letter from U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to U.N. Secretary
General Javier Perez de Cuellular (Dec. 29, 1983) (copy on file at the offices of the Virginia
Journal of International Law).
99. Letter from UNESCO Director General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow to U.S. Secretary of
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The new factor whose fundamental nature has perhaps not
always been sufficiently appreciated in this: the most
deprived countries have realized the basic importance of the
assertion of their cultural identity in the process of taking
full possession of their rediscovered dignity. They have also
realized that none of the major problems they face can be
properly solved without suitable development of education
at all levels, without a surer grasp of science and technology,
and without an increase in their potential in the various
fields of information and communication, given the extent to
which the techniques of communication are affecting and
will increasingly affect the life of both individuals and
societies. 101
Despite M'Bow's pleas, the United States withdrew from UNESCO
in December 1984.102
III. THE DEBATE OVER "FREE FLOW": THE ROLE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
A. First Amendment Rationales
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is cited by many
U.S. critics as the principled basis for their opposition to the New
World Information Order and similar proposals. 113 According to
these critics, the First Amendment constitutes a ban on restrictions
101. Id.
102. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1984, § I, at 3, col. 4.
103. For discussion of the impediment that commentators suggest the First Amendment
may pose to recognition of the New World Information Order, see Farley, Conflicts Over
Government Control of Information-The United States and UNESCO, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1071
(1985); Theberge, U.N.E.S.C.O.'s "New World Information Order": Colliding With First
Amendment Values, 67 A.B.A. J. 714 (1981).
The First Amendment, by its own terms, restricts only the U.S. Congress, though the
Supreme Court has applied it to the other branches of the federal government, as well as, by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, state and local governments. Although the Court has
been willing to assume "arguendo, that First Amendment protections beyond our national
boundaries," it has never sought to apply the dictates of the First Amendment to restrict any
foreign authority. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981).
Congress and the President, by adopting restrictions promulgated by a foreign or
international body into U.S. law, or by accepting such restrictions into a treaty, could create a
situation in which the First Amendment might apply. Similarly, a U.S. court, by seeking to
enforce such restrictions, could find itself at odds with the First Amendment. Absent action
by the U.S. government, the actions of foreign authorities are unlikely to raise domestic
constitutional issues. See Note, The New World Information and Communication Order: Is
the International Programme for the Development of Communication the Answer?, 15
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 953, 982-83 & n.104 (1983).
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on the press or the international flow of communications. Yet this
view of the First Amendment is inconsistent with two of the major
rationales which scholars and the Supreme Court have indicated
underlie the First Amendment.1 4
The first of these is the marketplace rationale, according to which
society benefits from an uninhibited exchange of ideas. John Locke
wrote:
[T]he business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opin-
ions .... For the truth certainly would do well enough if
she were once left to shift for herself ... She is not taught
by laws, nor has she any need of force to procure her
entrance into the minds of men.... [1]f truth makes not her
way into the understanding by her own light, she will be but
the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to
her. 105
The marketplace of ideas rationale does not require believing that
truth will always triumph over falsehood. Rather, part of the justifi-
cation stems from the idea that truth is not always easily recognized
and that truth may arise out of what was once perceived as falsehood.
It is therefore important that all speech-whether viewed as true or
false-be placed before the public.10 6
104. Two- less frequently cited rationales underlying the First Amendment are self-
fulfillment and safety-valve. The self-fulfillment rationale assumes that people have a natural
ability and desire to think freely and to express themselves freely. "Hence suppression of
belief, opinion, or other expression is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's
essential nature." T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6 (1970). Individuals
would be repressed and frustrated by limitations on their free expression. They would not
develop themselves or their ideas as fully; therefore, they would contribute less to society. See
generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 785-89 (1988).
The safety-valve rationale was articulated by Justice Brandeis, who wrote in Whitney v.
Californid:
[lit is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). By limiting the ability of an individual to
convince others of his ideas through spoken or written advocacy, laws curbing free expression
encourage discontent and violence. See T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the Frst
Amendment 11-15 (1966).
105. J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 45-46 (P. Romanell ed. 1955) (1st ed. 1689);
see also J. Mill, On Liberty 18, 28-29 (D. Spitz ed. 1975) (1st ed. 1859).
106. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("But
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas....").
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
According to the second rationale, self-governance, the First
Amendment protects unfettered free speech because in a democratic
society the public must have all information necessary to "govern."
Alexander Meiklejohn has written that a democratic society that
depends on its members to be both citizens and rulers must be open to
discussion about and criticism of government, even allowing for
"arguments against our theory of government."' 17
The vital importance of self-governance speech has run through
many U.S. Supreme Court opinions. The Court has repeatedly
asserted that:
expression on public issues "has always rested on the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values..
[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expres-
sion; it is the essence of self-government." There is a
"profound national commitment" to the principle that
"debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open." ' 8
These interpretations of the underpinnings of the First Amendment
are striking in that the two most often relied on by commentators and
courts-the marketplace of ideas and self-governance rationales-
both focus on listening as much as speaking. The marketplace of
ideas is valuable only to the extent that those ideas are received into
the society, to be debated, accepted, modified, or rejected; if an idea is
merely expressed, but not heard or read, it is of little value. Likewise,
speech which informs voters and elected officials has merit only if it is
heard by those voters and officials. The Constitution does not require
that someone listen to another's ideas, but it does protect another's
107. A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 65-66 (1948).
Meiklejohn also notes:
Shall we, then, as practitioners of freedom, listen to ideas which, being opposed to
our own, might destroy confidence in our form of government? Shall we give a
hearing to those who hate and despise freedom, to those who, if they had the power,
would destroy our institutions? Certainly, yes! .... We listen, not because they
desire to speak, but because we need to hear. If there are arguments against our
theory of government, our policies in war or in peace, we the citizens, the rulers,
must hear and consider them for ourselves. That is the way of public safety. It is the
program of self-government.
Id.
108. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (citations omitted); see
also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269-270 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
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right to express those ideas precisely so that if someone wishes to lis-
ten, she may.
This view of the First Amendment is consistent with restrictions,
such as time, manner, and place, that the Supreme Court has placed
on freedom of expression. 1 9 Moreover, this view is supported by
common sense and demonstrated practice. The town meeting is the
archetypal example of an occasion in which free speech warrants the
highest protection under the First Amendment. If, in a town meeting,
everyone spoke at the same time, no one would hear, nothing positive
would result, except for however better those in attendance felt for
having expressed themselves. What makes speech at the town meet-
ing work, is that while everyone may speak, they take turns doing so,
with one speaking while the others listen. It is only through this regu-
lation of speech- through these restrictions on the free flow of infor-
mation-that the goals which the First Amendment is designed to
serve are promoted.
B. Restrictions on the Press Generally
Within the United States, there exist in fact many restrictions on
the press and the flow of communications. Michael Gartner, presi-
dent of the News Division at NBC News and former president of the
American Society of Newspaper Editors, has identified at least eleven
contemporary restrictions on free speech in the United States.110
Consider the current precarious position of commercial speech in
the United States. Following Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tour-
ism Co.,1"' if the government can constitutionally regulate an activity,
it may also regulate speech regarding that activity. Posadas involved
advertisements for gambling in Puerto Rico. The U.S. Congress has
banned the advertisement on television of cigarettes; bans on products
containing alcohol are currently pending.' 1 2 Another example is
obscenity. Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Miller v. Califor-
109. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980)
("This Court has recognized the validity of reasonable time, place, or manner regulations that
serve a significant governmental interest and leave ample alternative channels for
communication").
110. Gartner, Speech to American Society of Newspaper Editors, San Francisco (Apr. 9,
1987).
111. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986).
112. See generally Lowe v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181 (1985); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Coop., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1981); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
1990]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
nia, "3 a broad variety of speech related to sexual conduct is suscepti-
ble to prohibition if it offends community standards." 4 "Fighting
words"-words that may incite listeners to violence-also may con-
stitutionally be regulated.' 1 5
Perhaps there is no greater restriction on free speech in the United
States than defamation law. Defamation actions in the United States,
while difficult to win, are easy to bring, extremely expensive for the
press to defend, and phenomenally costly in the few instances where
the press does lose. A great deal of attention has been focused on this
problem and the severe threat it poses to a free press. Scholars and
government officials have proposed a variety of solutions, including
limitations on punitive damages, procedural changes, and the creation
of a declaratory judgment action, but no one has suggested that defa-
mation actions be eliminated." 6 Despite the magnitude of the threat
to the press, particularly the smaller press, and despite the absolute
language of the First Amendment, no one is considering eliminating
the right of a defamed individual to seek to have her injury
compensated.
C. The Regulation of Broadcasting
Probably the closest analogy, however, to the international "free
flow" debate, and particularly arguments about cultural domination,
is the U.S. regulation of the television broadcast industry. The anal-
ogy is close because both domestic broadcast regulations and many of
the MacBride Commission proposals focus on broadcasting, as
opposed to print media; because the financial capital and technologi-
cal sophistication required to mount a broadcast operation is uniquely
relevant to both sets of regulations; and because in both cases the two
factors justifying the regulation are (1) economic and electromagnetic
113. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
114. See generally Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
115. See generally Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
116. See Smolla & Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal: The Case for
Enactment, 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 25 (1989); Annenberg Washington Program, Proposal
for the Reform of Libel Law (1988); Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content,
34 UCLA L. Rev. 1657 (1987); Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current
Libel Law, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 809 (1986); Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better
Alternative, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 847 (1986); Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of
Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
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spectrum scarcity, and (2) the importance of using scarce resources in
"the public interest."' 1 7 It is therefore profitable to examine the con-
siderable extent to which U.S. television broadcast regulations
impinge on the First Amendment, the rationales advanced by the gov-
ernment for that imposition, and the applicability of those rationales
to international communications regulations that might be unaccept-
able to the United States because they are thought to offend First
Amendment interests.
The federal government first regulated broadcasting in the Radio
Act of 1927.118 The 1927 Act contained a provision requiring broad-
casters that carry the advertisements of one political candidate to give
or sell equal time to opposing candidates.1 9 Since 1927, Congress has
imposed content-based limits-limits triggered by, or directed
towards, the content of speech, and the most suspect of regulations
under the First Amendment-on broadcast speech dealing with,
among other subjects, indecency,1 20 cigarette advertising,' 21 and
lotteries.122
Congress authorized the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to regulate broadcasting-at that time, still radio broadcast-
ing-in the Communications Act of 1934.11 According to the Act,
the FCC was to regulate broadcasting according to "public interest,
convenience and necessity."1 24 As with the 1927 Act, no mention was
made of the First Amendment rights of broadcasters; rather, the focus
was on the right of the society receiving the broadcast. Broadcasts
were to be regulated in a way that served the interests of that society,
within the limits of the technologically and economically possible.
One of the FCC's early regulatory acts was to define the relation-
ships that were permissible between a network programmer and a
local broadcast affiliate. This was done in an effort to assure that no
one person or group exercised too much control of programming.
This action was undertaken in spite of the First Amendment rights of
117. For the statutory standard for regulating broadcasting in the United States, see 47
U.S.C. § 309(a) (1982).
118. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). For a brief but more complete discussion of
the history of broadcast regulation see Dyk, Full First Amendment Freedom for Broadcasters:
The Industry as Eliza on the Ice and Congress as the Friendly Overseer, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 299,
301-08 (1988).
119. Id. § 18.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982).
123. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151ff (1982).
124. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1982).
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the network or the affiliate to broadcast what it could, how it could.
The FCC's action, when challenged in court, became the first real
First Amendment test of the FCC's regulatory activities. In National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States,1 25 the Supreme Court rejected
National Broadcasting Company's First Amendment claim:
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use
the limited facilities of radio .... Because it cannot be used
by all, some who wish to use it must be denied. ... The right
of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the
facilities of a radio without a license. 126
The rationale that the Court was referring to in this case has
become known as the scarcity rationale: because there is insufficient
electromagnetic spectrum for everyone to broadcast, the government
may legitimately deny some people's free expression rights. The
United States has accepted this principle on an international scale as
well, as evidenced by its participation in and support for international
conferences on broadcast spectrum and geostationary orbit allocation.
As part of the Communications Act, Congress passed what became
section 315, the equal time rule, under which a broadcaster who sells
or gives time for a candidate's use must treat all other candidates for
the same office equally. 127 In 1949, the FCC unveiled a broader
approach, known generally as the fairness doctrine. 28 According to
this doctrine, broadcasters are required to air issues that "are so criti-
cal or of such great public importance that it would be unreasonable
for a licensee to ignore them completely."'' 29 When the broadcaster
does treat such issues, it must assure that important contrasting views
are also presented.
In 1958, the Commission promulgated two corollaries to the fair-
ness doctrine: the personal attack rule, under which the FCC had
ordered stations that broadcast programs which attack a person's
character during a discussion of a controversial issue of public impor-
tance to inform the person and offer her an opportunity to rebut the
125. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
126. Id. at 226-27 (emphasis added).
127. 47 U.S.C § 315 (1982).
128. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) (report). The FCC
determined that the Fairness Doctrine violated the First Amendment in Syracuse Peace
Council v. Television Station WTVH, Syracuse, N.Y., 52 Fed. Reg. 31,768 (1987). For a more
complete description of the subsequent history of the fairness doctrine, see infra notes 132-36
and accompanying text.
129. T. Carter, M. Franklin, J. Wright, The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate 59
(1986).
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attack,'3 ° and the political editorializing rule, which gives candidates
the right to reply to editorials criticizing them or favoring their oppo-
nents. '3 It is from the former application of the fairness doctrine-
the personal attack rule-that the seminal statement on the constitu-
tionality of broadcast regulation arose.
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion,' 32 the Supreme Court considered whether the personal attack
rule violated the First Amendment. The Court reiterated its scarcity
argument, concluding that "Congress unquestionably has the power
to grant and deny licenses and to eliminate existing stations."' 33 The
Court analogized broadcasting regulations to restrictions on sound
trucks and public address systems:'3 4 "The right of free speech of a
broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does
not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others."1 35 This is
not to say, the Court continued, that the First Amendment is irrele-
vant to broadcast communications. Rather,
the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amend-
ment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount. It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licen-
see .... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and exper-
iences which is crucial here. 36
While the FCC, under a chairman noted for his deregulatory zeal,
Dennis Patrick, has dismantled one key component of the Commis-
sion's broadcast regulations-the fairness doctrine' 37-- most of the
130. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1987).
131. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1987).
132. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
133. Id. at 389.
134. See generally Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
135. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387.
136. Id. at 390 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
137. The elimination of the fairness doctrine has an involved history, which is recited only
briefly here. In 1987, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded a case
in which the FCC had sought to enforce the fairness doctrine against television station VTVH
to the Commission with instructions that the Commission consider the station's contentions
that enforcement of the fairness doctrine deprived the station of its constitutional rights.
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substantial restrictions discussed above remain.138  Some regula-
tions-such as those limiting broadcast indecency-are being
enforced by the Bush Administration FCC, under Chairman Alfred
Sikes, with renewed vigor. 139 Moreover, even the fairness doctrine,
following the FCC's action, was passed as a statute by the 100th Con-
gress,"4 although it was subsequently vetoed by the President.'41 Red
Lion, the Supreme Court's seminal statement on regulating the broad-
cast media, has been repeatedly upheld in subsequent Court
decisions.'42
Congress appears neither satisfied with current press restrictions in
the United States nor likely to remove any existing restrictions. On
the contrary, the 101st Congress has considered and continues to
debate bills which focus on television programming for children 43
and violence in video programming generally.'" The proponents of
these bills include traditional First Amendment defenders, like Sena-
tor Paul Simon (D-Ill.). In a recent column, Senator Simon asked,
"Is a free society like ours-one that shuns government censorship
and has a commercial television industry-powerless to protect itself
Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Noting that another panel of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had determined that the fairness doctrine was
not codified in the Communications Act, Telecommunications Research & Action Center v.
FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the Meredith court held that the Commission was not
free "to ignore a constitutional challenge to the application of its own policy merely because
the resolution would be politically awkward." Meredith, 809 F.2d at 873-74.
In Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 63 Rad. Reg.
2d (P&F) 541 (1987), the Commission addressed the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine
and determined that the doctrine was an unconstitutional restriction on broadcast speech. Id.
at 5052.
Congress responded by enacting a statutory fairness doctrine, S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987), but on June 19, 1987, President Reagan vetoed the bill. I 1 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
705 (June 19, 1987).
138. See supra notes 105-131 and accompanying text.
139. On October 26, 1989, the FCC instituted enforcement proceedings against eight
stations for broadcasting indecent material. Commission Announces Action on 95 Indecency
Complaints, 1989 FCC Daily Digest 313,127. Thirty-three Senators responded with a letter to
the FCC applauding the Commission's action. 33 Senators Applaud FCC Enforcement of
Indecency Standard, Comm. Daily, Nov. 29, 1989, at 2.
140. S. 742, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
141. 11 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 705 (June 19, 1987).
142. See, e.g., CBS, Inc., v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); FCC v. National Citizens Committee
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
143. S. 707, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by Sen. Metzenbaum); S. 1215, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by Sen. Wirth); H.R. 1677, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
(introduced by Rep. Bryant).
144. S. 593, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by Sen. Simon).
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and its children from the harm caused by excessive TV violence?""'-4
Many supporters of these pending bills see the proposed legislation
not as efforts to curb press freedom, but rather as practical responses
to important problems to which the media contribute. Moreover,
these legislators can justifiably claim the support of a long line of
precedents in which their colleagues in Congress, and the FCC, sup-
ported by the courts, have restricted the press either to give meaning
to the First Amendment or when no other means of achieving signifi-
cant social and political objectives was available.
D. The First Amendment and the "Free and Balanced Flow"
The principles enunciated in Red Lion, and the rationales which
underlie the First Amendment generally, are remarkably similar to
those proposed by developing countries. The representatives of those
countries argue that "free flow"-in the sense of unregulated flow-is
not consistent with U.N. standards on freedom of communication.
Rather, where there is a shortage of physical and economic resources,
where a dramatic imbalance already exists between speakers, and
where the communications are vitally important to the governance of
a society and the development of its members, some regulation is nec-
essary to avoid a chaos of communication in which no one can effec-
tively communicate, to avoid the communication of inaccurate
information, and to avoid the monopolization of the communicative
process by a few powerful players, particularly where those players
are politically similar.
Or, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, "Lilt is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."'" The government and the international community should
seek to create and preserve a communications "marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee."1 47 Each individual, in every country, has
a right to "receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences .... 4'
The First Amendment-rather than standing in opposition to
UNESCO's efforts to protect the free flow, to provide access to infor-
145. Simon, Coming Soon: An Act That Should Reduce Television Violence, Ne-day,
Aug. 21, 1989, at 55, col. 2.
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mation from a variety of sources, and to avoid monopolization of the
communications industry by Western mass media-may in fact man-
date such efforts. This does not mean that every restriction designed
to achieve those ends would be constitutionally permissible under the
First Amendment. Instead, it suggests that U.S. government and
press officials can no longer successfully hide behind the First Amend-
ment in refusing to take the concerns of the Third World about the
"free flow" seriously.
IV. THE NEW CHALLENGE: 1992 AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION BROADCASTING DIRECTIVE
The New World Information Order has largely faded from public
view. UNESCO Director General M'Bow was replaced in 1987 by
Federico Mayor, a Spanish biochemist who has proven far more ame-
nable to U.S. interests. On a recent visit to Washington, D.C., Direc-
tor General Mayor said "UNESCO must guarantee the free flow of
information-full stop." Plans for the New World Information
Order, Mayor said, "no longer exist." 14 9
Instead, the United States today finds its support for a press
unrestricted by other countries challenged from an unanticipated
source. Western European allies, not Third World countries, led by
France, not Tunisia, are seeking to protect their cultural identities by
restricting importation of U.S. programming. Recent actions by the
Council of Ministers of the European Communities (EC) and the
Council of Europe promise dramatic changes to the "free flow" of
communications into and throughout Europe.
Under the EC Council Directive Concerning the Pursuit of Televi-
sion Broadcasting Activities (Directive) adopted by the EC Council of
Ministers in Luxembourg on October 3, 1989,150 each of the twelve
Member States must take steps within eighteen months to regulate
broadcasters which are under its jurisdiction, operate on a frequency
allocated by the state, or transmit via a satellite ground station located
in the state. 5 ' The regulations include limiting the placement, con-
tent, and amount of advertising; regulating the content of program-
ming to protect minors and assure moral suitability; and guaranteeing
a right of reply to persons injured by the broadcasting of incorrect
149. Schwartz, UNESCO Chief Vows Major Reforms, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1989, at A19,
col. 4 (quoting Federico Mayor).
150. 32 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 298) 23 (1989) [hereinafter Directive].
151. Id. art. 2.
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facts. 152 In addition, and most troubling to U.S. observers, the Direc-
tive calls on Member States to ensure that a majority of broadcast
programming is of European origin. 153
The EC Directive resembles the Council of Europe's Convention on
Transfrontier Television (Convention) adopted by the twenty-two
member Council of Europe in March 1989." The Directive, how-
ever, once implemented by the Member States into their national laws
is enforceable through each Member State's national law and court
system, while the Convention requires a complicated arbitration pro-
ceeding to resolve disputes. In addition, if a Member State does not
act within two years, the Directive comes into force against each
Member State, but not against private entities, automatically.
A. Details of the Directive and the Convention
1. Source of Broadcast Programming
The Directive obligates Member States to ensure that "where prac-
ticable and by appropriate means," a majority of broadcast transmis-
sion time, excluding time occupied by news, sports, games,
advertising, and teletext, is reserved for "European works." 155 "Euro-
pean works" are defined to include programming originating from
Member States or other European states which are party to the Con-
vention, which also meet one of three conditions: (1) they are made
by producers "established" in Member States; (2) the production of
the works is supervised and actually controlled by producers estab-
lished in Member States; or (3) a majority of financing for each pro-
duction is supplied by EC co-producers and the co-production is not
controlled by any producer established outside of the EC.' 56
"European works" may also include programming originating from
European states which are neither Member States nor adherents to
the Convention, but is produced by producers established in Member
States or in European countries which will agree to abide by the
Treaty of Rome, provided that the production must be "mainly
made" with authors and workers residing in European countries.' 5'
Programming which meets none of the definitions above, can still
be considered a European work "to an extent corresponding to the
152. Id. arts. 10-23.
153. Id. art. 4.
154. Council of Europe, Convention Transfrontier Television (1989).
155. Directive, supra note 146, art. 4.
156. Id. art. 6.
157. Id.
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production of the contribution of European co-producers to the total
production costs," provided that the production is made "mainly"
with authors and workers residing in European countries. 58
In addition, the Directive requires that, where a Member State can-
not ensure that a majority of broadcast transmission time, excluding
time occupied by news, sports, games, advertising, and teletext, is
reserved for "European works," the state must at least ensure that the
percentage of non-European origin broadcasting does not exceed the
prior year's percentage. 59
Because of vociferous opposition from the Bush Administration
and the U.S. television and movie production industries,' 60 the Coun-
cil of Ministers issued an interpretive release promising that the quota
provisions would not be enforced against Member States.' 6' It is
unclear, however, whether that declaration is legally binding on the
EC or even whether the Commission, the EC's political branch, is
likely to go along. One Commission official stated: "Articles 4 and 5
are politically binding to the member states for the purposes of attain-
ing the objectives laid down in them.. .,62 Martin Bangemann,
Commission vice president, was quoted as saying: "I will not go to
court .... But a directive is a directive, and it is obligatory. We will
have to monitor the broadcasters. If the quotas haven't been met, the
Commission will report to the council and the Parliament."'' 63
2. Limits on Advertising and Sponsorship
a. Placement
The Directive regulates the placement of broadcast advertising and
indicates a strong preference for limiting advertising to the intervals
between separate programs. Advertising must be "readily recogniza-
ble as such and kept quite separate" from programs. 64
Article 11 contains more specific regulations affecting the place-
ment of advertisements. With few exceptions, advertisements are to
be inserted only between programs or between autonomous parts of
programs, such as the time between periods in sports events. Adver-
tisements are not permitted during religious services. News and cur-
rent affairs programs, documentaries, religious program other than
158. Id.
159. Id. art. 4.
160. See infra notes 177-205 and accompanying text.
161. EC Adopts Quota Directive; to Take Effect in 18 Mos., Variety, Oct. 4, 1989, at 1.
162. Id. at 2 (quoting Commission official).
163. Id. (quoting Martin Bangemann).
164. Directive, supra note 150, art. 10(2).
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actual services, and children's programs may not be interrupted by
advertising if they are of less than thirty minutes duration. Advertise-
ments during programs are permitted only if, in addition to the above
conditions, the "integrity and value of the programme... and the
rights of the rights holders are not prejudiced." 6 '
b. Content of Advertisements
The Directive provides stringent limits on the contents of broadcast
advertising. For instance, the Directive provides that television
advertising shall not:
(a) prejudice respect for human dignity;
(b) include any discrimination on grounds of race, sex or
nationality;
(c) be offensive to religious or political beliefs;
(d) encourage behavior prejudicial to health or to safety;
(e) encourage behavior prejudicial to the protection of the
environment. 166
Broadcast advertising for cigarettes and other tobacco products and
for medical products and treatments available only by prescription is
prohibited.1 67 Broadcast advertising for alcoholic beverages must not
be targeted at minors or depict minors consuming alcoholic bever-
ages; link alcohol consumption with enhanced physical, social, or sex-
ual success or with driving; place emphasis on high alcohol content as
being a positive quality; encourage immoderate consumption; or pres-
ent abstinence or moderation in a bad light. 1 6 Broadcasters must not
exploit the "inexperience or credulity" of minors or the "special trust
minors place in parents, teachers or other persons."' 69 Broadcast
advertising also should not encourage minors "to persuade parents or
others to purchase the goods" or "services being advertised or show
minors in dangerous situations."17 0
Advertisers may not use subliminal techniques nor engage in "sur-
reptitious advertising," which is defined by article 1 of the Directive
as representations in regular programming of goods, trademarks, or
other identifying features of a product or its producer intended to
165. Id. art. 11.
166. Id. art. 12.
167. Id. arts. 13-14.
168. Id. art. 15.
169. Id. art. 16.
170. Id.
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serve advertising purposes. 17 1
c. Amount of Advertising
The Directive restricts broadcast advertising to no more than fif-
teen percent of daily transmission time, or twenty percent of advertis-
ing including direct offers to the public provided that the spot
advertising does not exceed twenty percent. 172 Direct offers may not
exceed one hour per day and spot advertising may not exceed twenty
percent of any one hour period. 173
d. Sponsored Programming
Sponsors of programming must not affect the "responsibility and
editorial independence of the broadcaster." 174 The name or logo of
the sponsor must appear at the beginning or end of the program, and
the program may not contain special promotional references to any
product or service offered by the sponsor. 171 Producers of tobacco
and prescription medical products may not sponsor programming,
nor may news and current affairs programs be sponsored under any
conditions.176
3. Protection of Minors
The Directive broadly regulates the content of broadcast program-
ming to protect minors, as well as to achieve other social goals unre-
lated to the protection of minors. Member States are required to
restrict programs "which might seriously impair the physical, mental
or moral development of minors, in particular those that involve por-
nography or gratuitous violence," by time and means of broadcast, to
assure that minors in the area of transmission do not "normally" hear
or see such broadcasts.177 The Directive goes further, however, to
require Member States to "ensure that broadcasts do not contain any
incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or
nationality." 178
171. Id. arts. 1, 10.
172. Id. art. 18.
173. Id.
174. Id. art. 17.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. art. 22.
178. Id.
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4. Right of Reply
The Directive guarantees a right of reply to any natural or legal
person, irrespective of nationality, whose reputation or name have
been damaged by an assertion of incorrect facts in a broadcast pro-
gram. Member States are required to adopt measures implementing
this right of reply "or the equivalent remedies. "179
Broadcasters could refuse to grant a right to reply if it is not justi-
fied, would involve an act punishable under national law, would
render the broadcaster liable to civil proceedings, or would "trans-
gress standards of public decency." The right of reply measures must
be subject to judicial review."'
B. The US. Response
The European Broadcasting Directive poses an interesting opportu-
nity to see how the United States will respond to restrictions which
are equally or more intrusive than those proposed by Third World
countries, but which come from traditional allies and powerful trad-
ing partners.
Thus far the United States-both press and government-have
responded to the European broadcasting restrictions in much the
same way as they responded to the New World Information Order:
first neglect, then open hostility. But the vocabulary of the debate has
changed. The First Amendment rhetoric has been replaced by eco-
nomic parlance. Instead of "free flow," U.S. officials now employ
terms like "protectionism" ' and "economic fortress."'18 2
For instance, Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Associ-
ation of America, has argued that the European restriction "hurls a
lance right at the heart of the U.S. industry's future."' 1 3 Responding
to the charge that the proliferation of U.S. programming is damaging
European culture, Valenti responded:
Has culture botulism yet appeared anywhere in Europe? Is
179. Id. art. 23.
180. Id.
181. Television Broadcasting and the European Community: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1989) (statement of Julius L Katz, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative) [hereinafter Hearings]; id. at 20 (statement of J. Michael Farren, Under
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade).
182. Id. at 50 (statement of Richard Frank, President, Walt Disney Studios).
183. J. Valenti, The European Community Makes Ominous Sounds About Broadcast
Quotas, remarks to the Advisory Comm. on Int'l Comm. and Info. Pol'y, Dep't of State,
Wash., D.C., at 3 (July 17, 1989).
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the culture in any of these European countries so flimsily
anchored that European consumers must be caged and
blinded else their links with their past, like an exploding
star, vanish? Or is the real game not culture, but
commerce? 184
Richard Frank, president of the Walt Disney Studios, has predicted
that the broadcasting Directive marks the beginning of a descent
"into a new dark age of unending economic warfare."' 5
The response from the U.S. government has been no less agitated.
David Webster, senior fellow at The Annenberg Washington Program
in Communications Policy Studies, and chairman of the Trans-Atlan-
tic Dialogue on European Broadcasting, a working group of senior
communications industry officials from the United States and Europe,
described the scene as of November 1989:
During the past few months, Carla Hills has roared around
Europe, Mr. Mosbacher has assaulted the barricades of
Brussels, Jack Valenti has spoken out in Cannes, and Jim
Baker astonished the somewhat interim British foreign Sec-
retary, Mr. Major ... by raising with him twice, and in
sharpish terms, the issue of television quotas in Europe ....
To cap it off with the ultimate weapon, the President actu-
ally wrote to Margaret Thatcher on the subject. It's all good
stuff and unlikely to lose you many votes in the Congress or
in the country.18 6
U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills issued a statement
"deplor[ing]" the EC's decision as "blatantly protectionist and unjus-
tifiable," and referring to the European content provision as "an
enemy of free trade." 1 7  She also threatened action against the EC
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1988.188
184. Id. at 4.
185. Hearings, supra note 181, at 50 (statement of Richard Frank).
186. Remarks by David Webster, The Phony War: European TV Quotas and American
Excitement, to The Mid-Atlantic Club at the Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Wash.,
D.C. (Nov. 9, 1989) (copy on file at the offices of the Virginia Journal of International Law)
[hereinafter The Phony War]. The author gratefully acknowledges the generous assistance and
insight of David Webster.
187. Congress Lashes Out at European TV Content Restrictions, Comm. Daily, Oct. 13,
1989, at 1-2 [hereinafter Congress Lashes Out] (quoting U.S. Trade Representative Carla
Hills); Administration Urged to "Protect" U.S. Access to EC Broadcasting Market, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1337 (Oct. 18, 1989) (quoting U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills).
188. Hearings, supra note 165, at 9 (statement of Julius L. Katz referring to the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 99-418 § 1301, 102 Stat. 1164 (1988)).
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J. Michael Farren, Undersecretary of Commerce for International
Trade, testified before Congress that the Bush Administration has
made the broadcasting Directive one of "the highest" priorities on its
international trade agenda. 89 "We believe the Directive's restrictive
provisions are contrary to international law and the EC's obligations
under GATT. 190 They are unwarranted and unnecessary and pose a
real threat to an important U.S. industry." 191 Undersecretary Farren
went on to declare: "[E]ven if this were purely a cultural matter, this
would not constitute a reason for an exemption from basic rules of
fair trade. There is no GATT exception, for example, for a generic
exclusion of cultural items." 19
2
Following up on the Bush Administration threat to treat the Direc-
tive as a trade issue, Rufus Yerxa, U.S. Ambassador to GATT,
denounced the Directive at a GAIT meeting in Geneva on October
11, 1989, as "blatantly protectionist and discriminatory... and an
infringement of the United States' GATT rights."19 3 According to
Julius Katz, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, the Administration
believes that the Directive violates article I of GATT, dealing with
most-favored-nation status, by according preferential treatment to
broadcast programming from "other non-EC members of the Council
of Europe."1 94 Moreover, the Administration believes that the Direc-
tive violates the national treatment provision of article III, "which
requires GAIT contracting parties to extend to the products of other
contracting parties treatment 'no less favorable than that accorded to
like products of national origin.' "195
European officials have responded, however, that GATT is about
the supply of goods196 and television broadcasting is a service.1 97
Since the early 1970s, the United States and other countries have
sought to make services part of GATT and discussions to that end are
189. Id. at 20 (statement of J. Michael Farren).
190. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, A7, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
191. Hearings, supra note 181, at 20 (statement of J. Michael Farren).
192. Id. at 23.
193. Administration Urged, supra note 187, at 1337.
194. Hearings, supra note 181, at 10 (testimony of Julius Katz).
195. Id. at 11 (quoting GATT, supra note 190, art. III).
196. GAIT refers only to "the production and exchange ofgoods." GATT, supra note 190,
Preamble (emphasis added). "GATT presently regulates only trade in goods, although an
agreement on government procurement, negotiated during the Tokyo Round of 1979. applies
to 'services incidental to the supply of products' as well." Berg, Trade in Services: Toward a
"Development Round" of GAT Negotiations Benefitting Both Developing and
Industrialized States, 28 Harv. Int'l LJ. 1, 2 & n.8 (1987).
197. Harper, Europe's Changing Channels, American Way, Jan. 25, 1990, at 42, 46.
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currently underway in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.'
But at present, European representatives argue, broadcasting is a ser-
vice and therefore not covered by GATT. The European position is
strengthened somewhat by the holdings of the European Court of Jus-
tice in Sacchi199 and, most recently, in BVA v. Dutch State,20° that the
transmission of broadcast programming is a service under articles 59
and 60 of the Treaty of Rome.20 1 The EC may have anticipated the
GATT threat in the Preamble to the Directive: "Whereas television
broadcasting constitutes, in normal circumstances, a service within
the meaning of the Treaty [of Rome] .... .2o2
To the extent that the United States argues that the issue is video
programming-in the tangible sense of reels of film and magnetic
tape-rather than the provision of a television signal, the Europeans
point to article IV of GATT, which provides a partial exemption from
national treatment obligations for film.2°a
Action under the GATT could take years and the GATT has no
independent enforcement authority. In addition, Jean Dondelinger,
EC cultural affairs minister, argues that action under the GATT is
impossible because the quotas are not mandatory. The Directive
requires a majority of European-originated programming only "where
practicable and by appropriate means.' ' 2°  "[T]he allegations made
publicly by the American authorities that our directive is running
against the rules of GATT are unfounded."20 5
Irrespective of the likelihood that a trade complaint filed by the
United States under GATT would produce practical results, the U.S.
Congress has wasted no time in threatening a variety of unilateral
responses to the Directive. On October 4, 1989, Representative Bill
Thomas (R-Cal.) introduced a resolution calling on the U.S. Trade
Representative to use trade laws to retaliate against enactment of the
Directive. "Unless the Europeans are forced to change their directive,
they could conceivably be emboldened to place more trade barriers on
198. See Berg, supra note 184; Rivers, Slater & Paolini, Putting Services on the Table: The
New GATT Round, 23 Stan. J. Int'l L. 13 (1987).
199. Sacchi, Declaratory Ruling 155/73, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409, 432.
200. BVA v. Dutch State, decided Apr. 26, 1988 (unpublished).
201. "Service" is defined in article 60 of the Treaty of Rome in negative terms; that is, those
acts "normally provided for remuneration" that are "not governed by those provisions relating
to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons." EEC Treaty of 1957, art. 60.
202. Directive, supra note 150, Preamble.
203. GATT, supra note 190, art. IV.
204. Directive, supra note 150, art. IV.
205. Harper, Europe's Changing Channels, American Way, Jan. 15, 1990, at 42, 46
(quoting Jean Dondelinger).
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U.S. agricultural and industrial products." 2"
On October 11, Representative Bill Richardson (D-N.M.)
threatened to introduce legislation banning the Corporation for Pub-
lic Broadcasting from buying BBC and other European programming.
In a statement delivered on the floor of the House, Representative
Richardson said "[a]ny support from taxpayer-supported institutions
in furthering the European entertainment industry is unacceptable as
long as the EC broadcast initiative is in effect."' 7
Six days later, the House Ways and Means Committee unani-
mously approved a resolution attacking the Directive as "restrictive
and discriminatory" and calling on the Bush Administration to take
"all appropriate and feasible action" to protect U.S. access to Euro-
pean broadcasting markets.20 8 Representative Richard Schulze (R-
Pa.) summed up the mood in Congress when he said, "[i]t looks like
our worst nightmares are coming true. EC 1992 is nothing more than
a front for protectionism."2 "9
C. The First Amendment and the Broadcasting Directive
The First Amendment has so far not been dragged out to justify the
U.S. outrage at the broadcasting limits. This may be due in part to
the U.S. preoccupation with the economic issues involved in the Euro-
pean actions. It may also reflect some degree of understanding on the
part of U.S. officials that Western Europe is unlikely to be impressed,
much less stopped, by arguments couched in a uniquely U.S. concept
of free speech.210
It may also reflect a certain wariness on the part of U.S. officials to
employ the First Amendment to bolster opposition to concepts of
"free speech" which, in the United States, the First Amendment has
been used to justify. Given the limits on expression which the First
Amendment has been used to justify within the United States in the
service of preserving certain cultural ideals, its absence from the cur-
rent debate is noteworthy. As discussed above,21' the First Amend-
ment has been employed in the United States to support a variety of
limitations similar to many of those in the Directive and the Conven-
206. Europe Agrees to "TV Without Frontiers," Broadcasting, Oct. 9, 1989, at 42 (quoting
Rep. Thomas).
207. Congress Lashes Out, supra note 171, at 3 (quoting Rep. Richardson).
208. H. Res. 257, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
209. Administration Urged, supra note 187, at 1337 (quoting Rep. Schulze).
210. For discussion of the extraterritorial application of the First Amendment, see supra
note 98.
211. See supra notes 105-31 and accompanying text.
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tion. The U.S. government, citing the First Amendment for justifica-
tion, has imposed right of reply requirements on broadcasters in the
form of the personal attack rule, which guaranteed a right of reply to
individuals who are attacked in the course of a discussion of contro-
versial issues,"' and the political editorializing rule, which gave can-
didates the right to reply to editorials criticizing them or favoring
their opponents.213
The U.S. government has restricted advertising, based on the con-
tent of that advertising, for cigarettes, 214 lotteries, 215 and political can-
didates. 216 The responsiveness of programming to community needs
has been considered in the context of broadcast license renewals 217
and programming content is evaluated by the government for other
purposes as well. 218
Finally, while U.S. law does not directly restrict the involvement of
non-U.S. citizens or residents in broadcast programming, it does
impose stringent restrictions on the holding of broadcast licenses by
foreign persons. Federal law prohibits the FCC from granting a
broadcast license to a non-U.S. citizen or to any company if non-U.S.
citizens own or control more than twenty-five percent of the stock.219
The FCC is also forbidden from granting a broadcast license to any
corporation that has a non-U.S. citizen as an officer.220
Congress, the President, and the FCC have repeatedly relied on the
First Amendment to justify restrictions on the content of broadcast
speech, and have avoided First Amendment issues to severely limit
the involvement of non-U.S. citizens in U.S. broadcasting. Consid-
ered honestly, the First Amendment may argue for permitting certain
restrictions on the flow of information, even if those restrictions run
counter to certain trade principles.
212. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1989).
213. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1989).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
215. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982).
216. Pub L. No. 69-632, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
217. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(a)(8) (1989).
218. Programming content may be evaluated to determine if any qualifies as meritorious
programming and may therefore be considered in mitigation of licensee violations of FCC
rules. See RKO General, Inc. v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 927 (1982). Programming content may be evaluated to determine if the licensee qualifies
for a renewal expectancy. See Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983).
219. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (Supp. 1989).
220. Id.
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D. Looking Ahead
The European Community claims a heritage of free expression no
less deeply rooted than that of the United States under the First
Amendment. Both in international and regional agreements, Euro-
pean nations have repeatedly committed themselves to guaranteeing
the right of every citizen to communicate: "[e]veryone has the right
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers.'""
No right of unfettered communication, whether guaranteed by the
First Amendment, the United Nations Charter, or the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, quoted above tm is absolute. Former federal judge Robert
Bork has written:
Not too much should be made of the undeniable fact that
there will be hard cases. Any theory of the first amendment
that does not accord absolute protection for all verbal
expression, which is to say any theory worth discussing, will
require that a spectrum be cut and the location of the cut
will always be, arguably, arbitrary. The question is whether
the general location of the cut is justified. The existence of
close cases is not a reason to refuse to draw a line and so
deny majorities the power to govern in areas where their
power is legitimate.223
The controversy over the international "free flow" of information is
in large part a controversy over where those lines should be drawn.
In the United States, Congress and the Administration have drawn
those lines to protect the health of citizens,2' 4 to provide for expanded
access to the airwaves, 2 5 even to defend some sense of community
morality.226 When countries in the Third World and Western Europe
sought, in different ways, to draw lines to protect cultural values and
fledgling communications industries, the United States was outraged.
Many leaders in the Third World questioned why the U.S. response
221. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 art. 10(1).
222. See id.
223. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. LJ. 1, 28
(1971).
224. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 112-31 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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to the New World Information Order was so vociferous. European
officials are asking the same question about the broadcast Directive.
Current restrictions in the United Kingdom effectively restrict U.S.
programs to fourteen percent of broadcast television.227 Elsewhere in
Europe, the share of non-European broadcast programming is
approximately twenty-three percent. 228 A virtual explosion in Euro-
pean broadcasting outlets is expected to increase available air time in
EC countries from 250,000 hours per year to more than 400,000
hours per year within five years. 229 "That means that from the cur-
rent 80,000 hours a year, foreign broadcasters can look forward to up
to 200,000 hours," an increase of 150 percent.230 Moreover, under the
current country-by-country quota system, the penalties for non-com-
pliance have proven severe in some countries.23
Part of the cause for U.S. outrage is that the Directive is perceived
as posing economic issues. Exports of U.S. television programming
and films is the second largest contributor to a positive trade balance
for the United States, returning over $2.5 billion to the United States
during 1988. Europe alone constitutes approximately $1.8 billion in
revenues to the U.S. television and film industries.232 Moreover, it is
the European resale market for television movies that turn many
losers into big money-makers.233 Secretary Buckley's lament with
regard to the potential economic impact of the New World Informa-
tion Order, that other countries "wish to gain a foothold in an area
which represents the wave of the future," is thought by many to be
applicable to the EC broadcast Directive.234
The magnitude of danger posed by the Directive to U.S. program-
ming interests is impossible to assess with any precision. Representa-
tives of some U.S. organizations, particularly the Motion Picture
Association of America,2 35 have certainly claimed that the Directive
227. Revzin, The Battle for Europe's TV Future, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1989, at Bl, B4.
228. Wenham, Principles and Practicalities, Working Papers of the Trans-Atlantic
Dialogue on European Broadcasting 1 (1989) (copy on file at the offices of the Virginia Journal
of International Law).
229. Harper, supra note 205, at 46.
230. Id.
231. During the summer of 1989, the French Conseil supdrieur de I'audiovisuel announced
it would fine television stations $10,000 for every hour of programming that exceeded French
national broadcasting quotas, and promptly imposed a $6 million retroactive fine against a
station, La Cinq, for failing to adhere to existing national quotas limiting programming of non-
French origin. Hearings, supra note 181, at 54 (statement of Richard Frank).
232. Hearings, supra note 181, at 41 (statement of Jack Valenti).
233. Harper, supra note 205, at 44.
234. Buckley, supra note 87.
235. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30:371
"FREE FLOW" OF INFORMATION
constitutes an immediate and grave threat. As discussed above," 6
however, the Directive may pose significant economic opportunities
for U.S. program producers. The Trans-Atlantic Dialogue on Euro-
pean Broadcasting, which includes representatives from NBC, CBS,
Capital Cities/ABC Video Enterprises, Fox, the Hearst Corporation,
Warner Brothers, Walt Disney Television, as well as a number of U.S.
advertising agencies, law firms, and investment companies, issued a
press release shortly after passage of the Directive was announced,
applauding features of the Directive:
The Directive also provides substantial new opportunities
for non-European investors to play a vital role in the rapid
expansion of the European production industry, making
programs in Europe using European talent.
In summary, with the Directive now adopted, there are new
opportunities for growth and cooperation within Europe
and with other countries. 37
Even if no imminent economic harm is threatened, U.S. officials
have expressed considerable apprehension about the precedent cre-
ated by acquiescing in any "trade barrier." Undersecretary of Com-
merce for International Trade Farren told Congress, "[t]he quota
could also serve as a damaging precedent exacerbating pressure for
other such measures, in the EC and elsewhere."238 Jack Valenti
expressed the concern more vividly: "I have learned to my dismay
that all restrictions are infected with a viral contagion, leaping from
one market to another. They beget and breed other restrictions. It's
like being nibbled to death by ducks. 23 9
Opposition based on fear of the Directive as a precedent for other
trade-restrictive measures suggests that U.S. government and industry
officials do not believe or respect the motives articulated by the EC for
adopting the Directive. Representatives of the Bush Administration
have consistently maintained, in the words of Undersecretary Farren:
The EC's actions limiting non-EC countries to 50 percent of
television programming in the EC is pure and simple
protectionism.
236. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
237. European Ministers' Broadcast Directive Seen As Positive, Cooperative Step for
European TV Program Production Industry 2 (Oct. 3, 1989) (news release) (copy on fie at the
offices of the Virginia Journal of International Law).
238. Hearings, supra note 181, at 23 (statement of J. Michael Farren).
239. Id. at 41 (statement of Jack Valenti).
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The Directive . . . is a clear attempt to protect certain
domestic industries. Some European officials argue, how-
ever, that the measure is designed to protect European cul-
ture; and that it is not an economic measure at all.
We do not agree. It is clearly an economic measure
designed to protect the European industry from external
competition.2"
Yet in Europe, the issue actually is about culture, as well as trade.
"What makes Europe is its diversity," according to French play-
wright Jean-Claude Carriere. "If you take a plane from Paris and you
fly for half an hour, you find yourself in a totally different culture." If
you eliminate the distinctive cultural attributes, "we are not Europe
anymore."241 David Webster writes:
[The debate is] not about widjits. It's about, of course,
trade, but also about deeply complex linguistic and cultural
issues. They still occasionally tear up the cobblestones in
Belgium and throw them at each other on such matters....
Ethnic and linguistic factors-cultural issues-are still very
important in Europe.242
Because of its geographic setting, the size of its markets, and its
economic and industrial strength, the United States has had few occa-
sions to deal with neighboring countries over cultural issues. When
cultural issues have arisen, they have most frequently been raised by
other countries considering the impact of U.S. cultural norms. For
instance, Canada has repeatedly protested about the incursion of U.S.
terrestrial broadcast signals and DBS spill-over into Canadian
territory.2
4 3
Moreover, the United States claims a diverse variety of cultural
heritages and a comparatively short history as a sovereign nation. As
a result, while social critics may charge that a primary culture has
evolved which seeks to dominate others, in the United States less
attention is paid to the concept of a historically defined and distinct
culture than is in France or Italy.
Scholars disagree about the extent to which television influences
culture as opposed to culture influencing television, and the extent to
240. Hearings, supra note 181, at 20, 22 (statement of J. Michael Farren).
241. Bering-Jensen, Trouble Sticking with the Program, Insight, June 26, 1989, at 48
(quoting Jean-Claude Carriere).
242. Webster, The Phony War, supra note 186, at 4.
243. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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which culture can be protected by broadcasting quotas.2" But the
issue is taken very seriously in Europe where, out of an annual total of
105,000 hours of video programming, only 5,000 are actually pro-
duced in Europe.245 Robert Maxwell, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Maxwell Communications and MacMillan, Inc., testified
before Congress:
The heart of this issue, Mr. Chairman, is the preservation of
Europe's cultural diversity.
No nation should tolerate its culture being subjugated by a
foreign one. This is an extremely sensitive issue with Euro-
pean nations. This cannot be put into the category with beef
and automotive products. This issue speaks to the heart of
cultural integrity. 246
The angry U.S. response may also reflect the vigor with which the
U.S. government first broached the subject of the Directive with its
European allies. By the time the Administration became concerned,
the Directive had already been adopted by the European Parliament
and therefore could not be altered. The Administration could only
seek to have the measure defeated in the Council of Ministers.
[I]t was a matter of passing or not passing the Directive as
a whole. No European government wished to be seen to
give in to such overt American pressure, even if they them-
selves had no particular enthusiasm for the Directive....
Even the French, who had argued for sterner quota restric-
tions voted for it, possibly on the grounds that if the Ameri-
cans were so upset it must be ok.24 7
This European perception of the Administration's unfounded arro-
gance was only strengthened when the United States proposed that
244. These issues are beyond the scope of this Article. For interesting commentary on the
general subject, see Tracey, Global TV: The Myth of Wall-to-wall Dallas (copy on file at the
offices ofthe Virginia Journal of International Law); Bruce, Reidenberg & Cate, The European
Community Broadcast Directive: The Need for a Fresh Look at Its Impact on the
Fundamental Rights of Broadcasters and the Public, Working Papers of the Trans-Atlantic
Dialogue on European Broadcasting 4 (1989) (copy on file at the offices of the Virginia Journal
of International Law). The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and insight of
his former colleagues at Debevoise & Plimpton, particularly Robert R. Bruce and Jeffrey P.
Cunard.
245. Hearings, supra note 181, at 48 (statement of Robert Mfaxwell, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Maxwell Communications and MacMillan, Inc.).
246. Id.
247. Webster, The Phony War, supra note 186, at 4.
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Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher be invited to participate in
EC Commission deliberations on the Directive. "That's out of the
question," responded Corrado Pirzio-Birdi, acting head of the EC
Commission delegation in Washington, D.C. "Do you think the U.S.
Congress would ever give us a seat at the table in working out U.S.
legislation? I mean, you must be kidding." '248
The United States' effectiveness with European officials has not
been increased by frequent statements, like that of Undersecretary
Farren, that "the United States has no such programming quotas.
The U.S. market in audio-visual works is almost entirely unregu-
lated." 249 European officials know that not only is ownership of U.S.
broadcast outlets by non-U.S. citizens prohibited by statute,250 but the
United States imports less than two percent of its broadcast
programming. 251
The Directive offers an opportunity to U.S. program producers to
more than double their exports to Europe. Rather than dealing with
twelve or twenty-three separate national regulatory structures, the
Directive opens the door to pan-European broadcasting and a pan-
European market of 325 million consumers. More importantly, the
Directive provides the United States an opportunity to offer to other
countries its own well-developed, written jurisprudence of reconciling
the need to solve important societal concerns with profound regard
for one concept of freedom of expression.
Irrespective of the merits, if any, of the broadcasting Directive, or
of the New World Information Order, the United States has failed
thus far to make a significant positive contribution to help resolve the
issues which underlie the calls for both measures. Instead, the
response from the U.S. government and U.S. industry has been
marked by its preoccupation with economic issues, a corresponding
failure to understand or even seriously consider the objectives of
Third World or European nations, particularly where those goals
involve cultural issues, and an all-or-nothing, confrontational
attitude.
The New World Information Order is all but dead. The broadcast
Directive, on the other hand, is alive and well, at least for the
moment. In the long run, the threat of U.S. retaliation combined with
248. U.S. Lobbying on Broadcasting Measure "Counterproductive," EC Official Says, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1420, 1421 (Nov. 1, 1989) (quoting Corrado Pirzio-Birdi).
249. Hearings, supra note 181, at 23.
250. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
251. Harper, supra note 205, at 45.
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the more influential force of European consumer tastes, are likely to
give expanded meaning to the qualifying phrase, "where practical and
by appropriate means."2 5 2 The British may have received more per-
sonal attention from higher levels of the U.S. government than did the
Tunisians, but the outcome of their communications initiatives may
not be that different.
The U.S. government and the U.S. communications industry, not
often bedfellows, will have scored a victory of sorts. But they will
have missed the opportunity to achieve a greater victory: to use more
than 200 years of experience grappling with difficult First Amend-
ment issues-albeit different ones than other parts of the world may
now face-to assist other countries engaged in similar battles.
V. CONCLUSION
During the past three decades, many Third World countries have
complained that the flow of information between countries is dramati-
cally uneven. This communications flow may be characterized as
"free"-in the sense of unrestricted-but it is not equitable, just, or
productive. In fact, the imbalance in communications flow has had a
disastrous impact on the cultural development and integrity of many
Third World countries.
In 1980, the MacBride Commission completed a four-year study of
communications issues throughout the world. The Commission con-
cluded that the international flow of information was considerably
and systematically uneven, to the detriment of many Third World
nations and cultures. The Commission disavowed many of the more
radical Third World solutions, but it did call upon governments and
international organizations to adopt regulations to encourage greater
reciprocity in communications flow between the Third World and the
West. The Commission also called on the press to adhere to a higher
standard of ethics and accuracy, and to promote "the just cause of
peoples struggling for freedom and independence.""
The response of Western countries, and particularly the United
States, to these Third World concerns has ranged from indifference to
hostility. Spokespersons for the U.S. government and press have
expressed suspicion about Third World goals, focused on extreme
solutions rather than those of the MacBride Commission, and demon-
strated an unwillingness to consider any restrictions on the press.
252. Directive, supra note 150, art. 4.
253. MacBride Comm'n Report, supra note 17, at 265.
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Such restrictions, U.S. officials argue, would violate the First
Amendment.
These officials ignore, however, the substantial restrictions on the
press that the U.S. Supreme Court has held to be permissible under
the First Amendment. Moreover, these critics fail to recognize that
for the First Amendment and other national and international guar-
antees of free speech and free communication to have meaning, they
must permit some restrictions. Otherwise, there would be chaos in
place of communication. "Without government control, the medium
would be of little use because of the cacophony of competing voices,
none of which could be clearly and predictably heard. '2 54
The United States has a wealth of experience struggling to solve
important issues in light of the First Amendment. This history,
together with this unparalleled commitment to freedom of expression,
should inform U.S. policy when dealing with nations grappling with
similar issues, and should be offered as assistance in those struggles.
The regulation of broadcasting in the United States provides a par-
ticularly useful analogy. Where technological, economic, or political
factors make it impossible for everyone to have access to the media,
the government must act to assure that those who have access neither
monopolize the media nor use it to the detriment of societal interests.
This is what many Third World countries have sought. This is also
what many European countries seek.
The First Amendment, rather than bolstering economic arguments
that restrictions on broadcasting and other news flows are not to be
permitted, may weigh in favor of some restrictions. The justifications
for those restrictions may differ depending upon the context. Not all
restrictions in service of any public interest are to be allowed, but the
United States cannot hide behind the First Amendment, refusing to
consider Third World and European interests in a free and balanced
flow of communications.
254. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376.
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